Firm-Specific Information and the Efficiency of Investment by Anusha Chari & Peter Blair Henry
 
 
Firm-Specific Information and the Efficiency of Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
Anusha Chari
*                                   Peter Blair Henry** 
                   University of Michigan                      Stanford University and NBER 
 
November 2004 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We use a new firm-level dataset to examine the efficiency of capital investment in emerging 
economies.  In the three-year period following capital account liberalizations, the growth rate of 
the typical firm’s capital stock exceeds its pre-liberalization mean by an average of 5.4 
percentage points.  The return to capital rises in the post-liberalization period, suggesting that the 
investment boom does not constitute a wasteful binge.  In the cross-section, changes in 
investment are significantly correlated with the signals about fundamentals embedded in the 
stock price changes that occur upon liberalization.  Panel data estimations show that a 1-
percentage point increase in a firm’s expected future cash flow predicts a 4.1-percentage point 
increase in its investment; the country-specific shock to the cost of capital predicts a 2.3-
percentage point increase in investment; firm-specific changes in risk premia do not affect 
investment. 
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Do the investment decisions of firms in emerging economies reflect information about 
the fundamentals of those firms?  On the one hand, there is little reason to expect an affirmative 
answer to this question.  Stock prices in emerging economies generally contain little firm-
specific information (Morck, Yeung and Yu, 2000).  If managers in emerging economies make 
investment decisions in accordance with changes in stock prices, but those prices contain little 
information about their firms, then investment will also be divorced from firm fundamentals.   
On the other hand, the firm-specific information contained in stock prices tends to rise as 
countries move towards greater capital market openness (Li, Morck, Yang, and Yeung, 2004).  
And, with few exceptions, the data show emerging economies moving rapidly in that direction 
(Stulz, 2004).  For example, when countries open their stock markets to foreign investment, 
publicly traded firms in the liberalizing countries experience large stock price changes, and firm-
specific risk-sharing characteristics explain much of the cross-sectional variation in prices (Chari 
and Henry, 2004). 
While Chari and Henry show that the cross-sectional variation in fundamentals helps 
explain changes in stock prices, they do not attempt to relate fundamentals to the cross-sectional 
variation in investment.  In contrast to Chari and Henry (2004) who focus exclusively on stock 
prices, this paper tackles the issue of investment.  Specifically, we ask the following question: 
Do the real investment decisions of firms in emerging economies respond to the implicit signals 
about changes in fundamentals that are embedded in the stock price changes we see when 
countries liberalize?  We attempt to answer this question by using the International Finance 
Corporation’s Corporate Finance Database to construct a new dataset on investment by 369 firms 
in India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand from 1980 to 1994.  With these data in hand, we 
  1provide the first set of facts about the investment of emerging market firms in the aftermath of 
stock market liberalizations. 
Figure 1 presents the first fact.  Investment booms in the aftermath of liberalizations.  For 
the average firm in our sample, the growth rate of the real value of the capital stock exceeds its 
pre-liberalization mean by 3.8 percentage points in the first year after liberalization, 5.4 
percentage points in the second year, and 2.2 percentage points in the third.  The fact is 
uncontroversial.  Its interpretation is not. 
The boom in Figure 1 might be evidence of profit-maximizing companies allocating 
capital in response to fundamental changes brought on by liberalization.  But Figure 1 might also 
be evidence of inefficiency writ large—overzealous firms collectively engaged in a wasteful 
investment binge.  We attempt to distinguish between these two competing interpretations by 
analyzing whether the typical firm’s post-liberalization investment decision reflects a rational 
response to the signals embedded in the stock price changes that occur when countries liberalize 
(Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Henry, 2000a; Stulz, 1999, 2003; Martell and Stulz, 2003). 
A change in a firm’s stock price  signals a change in one or both of the following 
fundamentals: (1) the firm’s expected future cash flow; (2) the firm’s cost of capital.  Stock 
market liberalizations may lead to changes in expected future cash flows, because liberalizations 
often coincide with other important economic reforms (e.g. inflation stabilization or trade 
opening) that increase total factor productivity, economic growth, and the profitability of 
investment (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Henry, 2002, 2003).  Accordingly, post-liberalization 
changes in investment may be driven by reform-induced changes in expected future cash flow.  
Simply put, firms that see their expected future profitability rise with liberalization should, on 
average, invest more than those firms for whom liberalization adversely affects profitability. 
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explain changes in firm-specific investment.  The post-liberalization changes in investment are 
significantly correlated with changes in our measure of expected future cash flow.  A 1-
percentage-point increase in the growth rate of a firm’s expected future cash flow predicts a 2.9- 
to 4.1-percentage-point increase in the growth rate of its capital stock, depending on the 
specification. 
Liberalizations may also affect investment by changing a firm’s cost of capital.  The first 
channel through which it does so is a common shock to all firms in the economy—a fall in the 
aggregate risk-free rate as the country moves from financial autarky to world-market integration.  
All else equal, the common shock to the cost of capital will increase the average investment rate 
of all firms.  The data confirm this prediction.  The common shock to firms’ cost of capital 
accounts for a 2.3-percentage-point per-year increase in the typical firm’s capital stock growth 
and is statistically significant in almost every specification.  
In principle, the second cost-of-capital channel through which liberalization affects 
investment is a firm-specific “beta” effect.  With liberalization, the relevant benchmark for 
pricing the risk of individual stocks switches from the local stock market index to the world 
market index.  Consequently, the equity-risk premium falls for firms whose returns are less 
correlated with the world market than they are with the local market and vice versa.  Given the 
common shock, the firm-specific shock implies that firms whose equity premia fall should invest 
even more than those whose premia rise. 
In practice, the available data may be inadequate for testing the cross-sectional 
relationship between investment and risk (the beta effect).  Relating changes in investment—an 
annual variable—to changes in risk, forces us to compute annual covariances.  Since monthly 
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to-noise ratio in our annual covariance data is even higher.  Indeed, we find that changes in risk 
have no discernible impact on changes in investment.  For example, firm-specific changes in 
equity premia have an economically trivial effect on changes in investment and are statistically 
insignificant in every specification.  Measurement problems notwithstanding, Section 2B.1 of the 
paper explains why it is still important to test whether changes in the cross-section of risk explain 
changes in the cross-section of investment.   
In addition to providing the first systematic study of firm-level investment following 
liberalizations, the paper makes several other contributions.  First, it describes a valuable new 
source of firm-level data to economists conducting research on the real effects of economic 
reforms.  Publicly available datasets such as Worldscope and Global Vantage contain virtually 
no data on firms in developing countries before the early 1990s and are therefore not suitable for 
studying the firm-level impact of the reforms that began in the mid 1980s.  In contrast, the firm-
level dataset used here spans the pre- and post-reform period. 
Second, firm-level data provide a more reliable and transparent view of the channels 
through which liberalization affects real resource allocation than previous studies that use macro 
data.  For example, aggregate investment rises in the aftermath of liberalizations (Henry, 2000b).  
But it is not clear how much confidence we can have in a result that attributes an economy-wide 
investment boom to a policy change that directly affects only stock-market-listed firms.  Stock-
market-listed firms account for no more than a third of the economic activity and a small fraction 
of aggregate investment in the liberalizing countries.  Similarly, the growth rate of GDP per 
capita increases in the aftermath of liberalizations (Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, 2004).  But 
since the link from liberalization to GDP growth works through investment, it too, must be 
  4treated with skepticism (Henry, 2003).  Instead of using aggregate investment data as a proxy for 
the investment of the firms affected by liberalization, this paper uses the investment of only 
stock-market-listed firms.  Instead of using macroeconomic indicators as proxies for the effects 
of contemporaneous economic reforms on the expected future profitability of investment, we 
control directly for changes in firms’ profitability with the real value of sales and earnings taken 
from their income statements. 
 
1.  Time Series Facts About Firms, Liberalization, and Investment 
Between 1980 and 1994, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) collected annual 
balance sheet and income statement data for a maximum of the 100 largest publicly traded, non-
financial firms in eleven developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe.  When deciding in which countries it would 
collect data, the IFC employed two screening criteria: (1) quality data had to be available for a 
reasonably large number of firms; and (2) developing countries from each continent had to be 
represented.  For several countries the sample begins after 1980 because the early years did not 
contain data of sufficiently high quality. 
In order for the firms of a country in the IFC database to be included in our sample, the 
country must satisfy one additional criterion.  The IFC’s data for the country must exist before 
and after the year in which it liberalized its stock market.  The before-and-after criterion 
produces our sample of 369 firms spread across India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
Table 1 uses relative stock market capitalizations to summarize the importance of the 
firms in the IFC sample for the five countries as a whole.  The market capitalization of the 369 
firms constitutes 40 percent of these countries’ total market capitalization.  While the 40-percent 
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activity, the point should not be overstated because publicly traded corporations in developing 
countries make up a smaller fraction of the economic base than in developed countries.   
The IFC database reports the nominal value of net fixed assets (the stock of property, 
plant, and equipment less depreciation) on an annual basis.  In order to obtain the real growth 
rate of each firm’s capital stock, the ideal adjustment procedure would deflate the percentage 
change in net fixed assets (NFA) by the rate of inflation of each firm’s capital goods.  Since no 
such capital goods data exist, we deflate using the Consumer Price Index in three steps.  First, we 
take the natural log of nominal NFA at time t+1 and subtract the natural log of NFA at time t.  
Second, we take the natural log of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) at time t+1 and subtract the 
natural log of the CPI at time t.  Third, we subtract the second quantity from the first to produce 
the real growth rate of each firm’s capital stock between t and t+1.   
 
1A.  Firms Experience Investment Booms in the Aftermath of Liberalizations 
We use the data on real capital stock growth to evaluate the statistical significance of the 
investment spike in Figure 1.  We do so by running a simple panel regression:  
(1)   [] ijt i ij ijt INVESTMENT FIRM LIBERALIZATION α ε =+ + Τ+ ,  .  [0, 3] Τ∈ +
ijt INVESTMENT  is the real growth rate of the capital stock of firm i in country  j  in year t.  
 is a firm-specific dummy variable.  The coefficient on the dummy variable 
 measures the average deviation of firm i's capital stock growth from its 
average over the 0 to +3 period.  For example,   measures the average 
effect of liberalization on investment across all firms in year [0].   
i FIRM
LIBERALIZATIO [] ij N Τ
[0]ij LIBERALIZATION
  6Since all firms in a given country are “clustered” around the same liberalization date, the 
covariances between individual firms’ capital stock growth rate deviations may not be zero.  If 
this is the case, the standard distributional assumptions about the error term, ijt ε , no longer 
obtain.  We adjust for clustering by allowing the off-diagonal elements in the variance-
covariance matrix, to be different from zero.  The estimation procedure also corrects for 
heteroscedasticity across firms.  Table 2 shows that the coefficient on  [ ]ij LIBERALI N ZATIO Τ  is 
statistically significant at almost every time horizon.  Column (1) presents estimates that include 
firm-fixed effects.  Column (2) presents estimates that include country-fixed effects.  
 
1B.  Would a Control Group of Firms Exhibit the Same Spike in Investment? 
One should not look at the investment response of firms in liberalizing countries in 
isolation.  If liberalizations coincide with a positive shock to the world business cycle, then the 
investment of firms in countries that do not liberalize may rise in concert with the investment of 
firms in countries that do.  The ideal attempt to distinguish the effect of liberalization from that 
of an exogenous shock would compare the investment response of the firms in the liberalizing 
countries (Figure 1) with a control group—firms in a similar group of developing countries that 
did not liberalize.  Unfortunately, we have no such data.   
Since we cannot construct a proper control group, we adopt alternative measures to allow 
regression (1) to account for the effects of exogenous global shocks.  Specifically, Column (3) of 
Table 2 presents estimates that include variables to control for the world business cycle.   The 
controls are: the contemporaneous change in the growth rate of OECD industrial production; the 
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1  Column (4) 
re-estimates the country-fixed effects model, adding in the business cycle controls.  The results 
in Column (4) show that the growth rate of the capital stock exceeds its pre-liberalization mean 
by 4.7 percentage points in years [0] and [+1], 8.2 percentage points in year [+2], and 6.9 
percentage points in year [+3]. 
Multiplying the investment deviations by the elasticity of output with respect to capital 
(about one-third), gives a rough sense of the economic significance of the liberalization-induced 
growth deviations: 1.6 percentage points in years [0] and [+1], 2.7 percentage points in year [+2], 
and 2.3 percentage points in year [+3].  Rough as they may be, these are large numbers with non-
trivial implications for aggregate welfare given the size of the firms in our sample. 
On the one hand, the results in Table 2 are not entirely surprising since aggregate capital 
stock growth rises by 1.1 percentage points per annum in the aftermath of liberalizations (Henry, 
2003).  On the other hand, it is not clear how much confidence we should have in the aggregate 
result, because the aggregate data consist of investment by publicly traded firms, non-publicly 
traded firms, and the government.  Since liberalization most directly impacts the investment 
incentives of publicly traded firms, the firm-level effects documented here are more tenable—
and larger, as theory would predict.
2 
 
1C.  Is There a Price Mechanism at Work? 
A rise in Tobin’s Q is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the investment boom 
to be a profit-maximizing response by firms to an increase in the market value of their installed 
                                                 
1 Leads and lags of the control variables were also tried but did not yield significantly different results. 
2 The 5.4-percentage-point increase in the level of investment reported here is also larger than the 22-percentage-
point increase in the growth rate of investment documented in Henry (2000b).   
  8capital.  For each firm in the sample, we construct Tobin’s Q as follows.  The numerator is the 
sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt (current and long-term liabilities); 
we use book values of debt because the IFC database does not contain information on market 
values.  The denominator is the book value of total assets.   
The level of Tobin’s Q may not be directly comparable across countries, because of 
differences in accounting practices.  For example, firms in India, Malaysia, and Jordan value 
assets using fair-market valuation in accordance with North American Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP).  In contrast, Korea and Thailand rely on strict historic-cost 
accounting as in Germany and Japan (Booth et al., 2001).  In light of these differences, we focus 
on the percentage changes in Q.  The last column of  Table 1  shows that the average firm 
experiences a 46.1-percent jump in Tobin’s Q at liberalization.  While the jump in Q does no 
harm to the efficiency view of investment, the data beg the following question. 
 
1D.  Is the Investment Boom an Indiscriminate Response to a Stock Market Bubble? 
Since the jump in Tobin’s Q comes from the increase in stock prices that occurs at 
liberalization, it is important to remember that stock prices sometimes deviate from their 
fundamental values (Shiller, 1981, 2000).  Ramping up investment in response to a stock price 
bubble may maximize someone’s private objective function, but it can hardly be called efficient 
in a social welfare maximizing sense.
3 
For example, speculation about the new economy drove US stocks to unprecedented 
levels in the late 1990s.  Many firms used the stock market bubble as a cheap means of raising 
capital to implement wasteful investment projects that resulted in billions of dollars of excess 
                                                 
3 See Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993), Fischer and Merton (1984), and 
Stein (2003) for an extensive discussion of efficient investment when stock prices deviate from fundamentals. 
  9capacity.  The surfeit of fiber optics cable laid by telecom firms provides a particularly salient 
example.  We now know that US firms continued investing en masse, even as the aggregate rate 
of return to capital was falling precipitously.  If inefficient, bubble-driven investment has 
negative social consequences in the US where capital is relatively abundant, then it will be all the 
more costly in capital-scarce developing countries. 
In order to assess whether liberalization fosters inefficient investment, we examine the 
ex-post rate of return to capital.  For each firm, we compute the flow return to the stock of capital 
as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the value of net fixed assets.  After computing 
this ratio for each of the 369 firms, we take a simple average and call it the aggregate rate of 
return to capital. 
Figure 2 shows that the rate of return to capital actually increases from an average of 16.0 
percent per year in the pre-liberalization period (years -3 to –1) to 24.3 percent per year in the 
post-liberalization period (years +1 to +3).  Whether managerial prescience or just dumb luck, it 
seems untenable to argue that liberalization stimulated wasteful investment when the rate of 
return to capital actually rises in the post-liberalization period. 
While Figure 2 appears inconsistent with the notion of indiscriminate, bubble-driven 
investment, we would expect to see some decline in capital’s rate of return as firms buy and 
install new machinery.  Why does this not happen?  The answer is that liberalizations coincide 
with important economic reforms that may increase total factor productivity, economic growth, 
and the profitability of investment (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Henry, 2003).  Figure 3 
demonstrates the point.  The growth rate of real sales and real earnings both increase sharply 
during liberalization episodes. 
There is no glaring evidence of inefficiency in the time series profiles of investment and 
  10the fundamentals.  Yet for firms to invest efficiently, they must be discerning not only in the time 
series but also in the cross section.  In turn, cross-sectional efficiency requires that firms’ post-
liberalization investment decisions systematically reflect the signals about fundamentals that are 
embedded in the stock price changes that occur at liberalization.  Whether or not this is the case 
is the question to which we now turn. 
 
2.  Cross-Sectional Facts About Firms, Liberalization, and Investment  
If markets are efficient, then changes in stock prices are a summary statistic for changes 
in the fundamentals.  To the extent that the responses of firms’ stock prices to liberalization 
reflect news about the present value of future cash flow, those price responses should have some 
predictive power for the post-liberalization changes in investment.  To that end, let 
 denote the percentage change in firm i’s real stock price during the 
liberalization year. 
i LIBERALIZATIONRETURN
Analyzing firms’ investment responses to liberalization also requires a measure of the 
unexpected growth rate of their capital stocks relative to some benchmark.  All else equal, in the 
instant before the news of liberalization arrives, the pre-liberalization mean of a firm’s capital 
stock growth rate is a reasonable forecast for its expected future growth rate.  Accordingly, 
define the variable  it INVESTMENTDEVIATION  as the growth rate of firm i's capital stock in 
year t minus its average pre-liberalization growth rate (calculated over the years -3 to –1).   
To the extent that firms’ investment follows market signals,  it INVESTMENTDEVIATION  
should be positively related to  .  If investment is inefficient, there 
should be no systematic relation between the two variables.  Equation (2) shows that the 
coefficient on   has the predicted sign and is significant at the one 
i LIBERALIZATIONRETURN
i NRETURN LIBERALIZATIO
  11percent level (standard errors in parentheses; adjusted R-Squared=0.01; N= 1185): 
(2)  it INVESTMENTDEVIATION  = 0.001 + 0.056 ,    i LIBERALIZATIONRETURN [0, 3] t∈+
                                                               (0.012)  (0.014)  
The low value of R-squared indicates a lot of unexplained variation and might be interpreted as 
evidence of inefficiency.  But it is important to remember that the principal objective of 
empirical work is to obtain dependable estimates of the true regression coefficients, not to 
achieve high values of R-squared (Gujarati, 1988, p. 186).   
Bearing that caveat in mind, equation (2) provides reasonable support for the theory.  On 
average, the larger the impact of liberalization on a firm’s stock price, the larger is its post-
liberalization increase in capital stock growth.  More importantly, a simple calculation illustrates 
that the simple correlation between the change in investment and the stock price change is 
economically significant.  The average value of   in our sample is 
51 percent.  So, equation (2) predicts that the growth rate of the average firm’s capital stock will 
exceed its pre-liberalization mean by 2.9 percentage points (51 percent times 0.056) in each of 
the years [0, +3].  The implication of this estimate for output growth is not small—about one 
percentage point per year. 
i LIBERALIZATIONRETURN
 
2A.  Do Changes in Future Growth Opportunities Drive the Changes in Investment? 
In the absence of bubbles (Section 1D), a change in a firm’s stock price signals a change 
in the firm’s expected future earnings or its cost of capital.  Therefore, it is important to 
understand whether the post-liberalization changes in investment are correlated with the “news” 
in expected future growth opportunities.  To that end, define  i FUTUREGROWTH τ  as the growth 
rate of firm i's sales in year τ  (where τ  runs from +1 to +3) minus the average growth rate of 
  12firm  i's sales in years –3 to -1.  Equation (3) shows that  it INVESTMENTDEVIATION  is 
correlated with  i FUTUREGROWTH τ  (standard errors in parentheses; adjusted R-squared=0.07; 
N=1292): 
INVESTMENTDEVIAT i UREGROWTH τ [0, 3] t∈+
ijt ij INVESTMENT SALESGROWTH
2SALESGRO ijt ijt β ε
INVESTMENT
ijt SALESGROWTH
(3)   it ION = 0.023  + 0.295FUT ,  . 
                                      (0.009)   (0.029)   
Again, the economic significance of the unconditional correlation between the left- and right-
hand-side variables is nontrivial.  News that FUTUREGROWTH for firm i will be 10 percentage 
points higher predicts that its capital stock growth will deviate from its pre-liberalization mean 
by 2.95 percentage points.   
It is natural to ask whether the predictive power of sales growth for investment during 
liberalization episodes differs from the predictive power of sales growth for investment at any 
generic point in time.  In order to address the issue, we estimate the following specification: 
(4)     1 t j CNTRY α β = ++  
    * ijt WTH LIBERALIZATION ++ .  
Note that the variable  ijt  is the absolute growth rate of the real capital stock, not 
deviations of the growth rate from the mean as in equation (3).  Similarly,   is 
the absolute growth rate of real sales.  The reason for not using deviations is that equation (4) 
estimates the behavior of investment over the entire sample (not only the post-liberalization 
period) and deviations from the mean over the entire sample will, by definition, be equal to zero. 
Equation (4) is similar in spirit to the estimations in Wurgler (2000).  Wurgler’s cross-
sectional exercise examines whether the responsiveness of investment to profitability is higher in 
countries with more developed financial systems.  We ask whether liberalization alters the 
responsiveness of firms’ investment to changes in their profitability, taking the country’s 
  13financial development as given.  It would be useful to investigate how a country’s financial 
development affects the ability of firms to respond to liberalization, but with only five countries 
in our sample there is not enough cross-country variation to address the issue. 
If the responsiveness of investment to sales at a generic time, t, is the same as when t is a 
liberalization year, then the coefficient on SAL ijt ijt ESGROWTH LIBERALIZATION ∗  should not 
be significant.  Table 3 shows that both the coefficient on   and the interaction 
term are significant.  The coefficient on SAL
ijt SALESGROWTH
ijt ijt ESGROWTH LIBERALIZATION ∗  ranges from 
0.056 to 0.21 and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.   
The coefficient on  ijt ijt SALESGROWTH LIBERALIZATION ∗  may be significant because 
firms lack access to external finance.  The increase in the growth rate of sales that occurs at 
liberalization is unusually large (Figure 3); this shock to profitability may simply provide firms a 
cash windfall with which to finance projects that they could not implement in the pre-
liberalization period.  We now turn to a more thorough investigation of the possibility that the 
firms in the sample face financial constraints. 
 
2A.1  What If Capital Markets Are Not Frictionless? 
In a frictionless capital market world, only expected future growth opportunities should 
matter for investment.  If liberalization bodes well for the future, then investment should 
increase, regardless of the firm’s current cash flow.  There is ample evidence, however, that 
current cash flow exerts a significant influence on investment (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 
1988; Hubbard, 1998).  So, an alternative view is that investment rises because liberalizations 
ease financing constraints by increasing the amount of cash in the firm.   
In order to examine whether  it INVESTMENTDEVIATION  is significantly related to 
  14current cash flow we construct a variable called CASHFLOWDEVIATION, which is defined as 
the growth rate of firm i's sales in year t minus the average growth rate of its sales in years –3 to 
-1.  Equation (5) shows that the coefficient on CASHFLOWDEVIATION is the same order of 
magnitude as the coefficient on FUTUREGROWTH in equation (3) and is statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level (standard errors in parentheses; adjusted R-squared=0.01; N=1292):  
(5)  it INVESTMENTDEVIATION = 0.038 + 0.221 ,  t .  it CASHFLOWDEVIATION [0, 3] ∈+
                          (0.01)    (0.05)   
But the interpretation of the coefficient on CASHFLOWDEVIATION is less straightforward. 
If firms face financing frictions, investment will be sensitive to current cash flow.   
However, the converse of the preceding statement need not be true.  Sensitivity of investment to 
current cash flow need not imply that firms face financial constraints.  Firms’ investment may be 
sensitive to cash flow, even in the absence of financial constraints that impede their ability to 
implement optimal investment decisions (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, 2000; Stein, 2003). 
A number of models of corporate investment in the presence of capital market frictions 
can account for the significant coefficient on CASHFLOWDEVIATION in equation (5), and an 
attempt to distinguish between all of the competing explanations lies beyond the scope of this 
paper.
4  Instead we ask the question most germane to the task at hand: Is there any evidence that 
a lack of access to external finance impedes the invisible hand from optimally allocating 
investment?  While access to external finance would not seem to be an issue for the 100 largest 
manufacturing firms in a country—large established firms with lots of tangible assets tend to 
have access to credit—Table 4 examines several variables that speak directly to the issue.
5 
                                                 
4 See Stein (2003) for a review of the literature on capital market imperfections and corporate investment. 
5Our analysis of access to external finance is similar in spirit to that of Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) and 
Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
  15Begin with dividends.  A firm that pays dividends could invest more by cutting 
dividends, so it seems unlikely that a dividend-paying firm suffers from capital rationing (Lang 
and Stulz, 1994).  All of the firms in our sample pay dividends.  Furthermore, there is a 
significant increase in dividend issuance following liberalization (Row 1 of Table 4).  Again, it 
seems unlikely that capital-constrained firms would, on average, increase dividends at the very 
moment investment opportunities are improving (Figures 2 and 3).  Next, turn to debt.  All of the 
firms in our sample have long-term debt, which again does not suggest an inability to access 
external finance.   
To provide a more general picture of the extent to which the firms in our sample use 
external sources to finance investment, Table 4 lists several indicative variables: dividends, long-
term debt, total external finance, retained earnings, and equity.  We construct the ratio of the 
change in each variable to the change in the stock of net fixed assets (investment).  We then 
calculate the average value of the ratio before liberalization, the average value after 
liberalization, and test whether the difference between the two averages is statistically 
significant. 
Table 4 shows that reliance on external finance rises in the aftermath of liberalizations, 
but not significantly so.  Furthermore, there is a significant increase in reliance on internal funds.  
The evidence in Table 4 taken together with the evidence in Section 2A suggests that the firms in 
our sample increase investment when future growth prospects improve, but they also increase 
investment when they have a lot of cash.  These facts are roughly consistent with what we know 
about the investment behavior of firms in developed countries (Stein, 2003).  Again, sorting 
through all of the alternative explanations of these facts lies beyond our ambit.  Here is the 
central point:  While financial constraints are surely an issue for some firms in the countries we 
  16study, there is no glaring evidence that a lack of access to external finance severely impedes the 
investment decisions of the 369 firms in our sample.  
 
2B.  Do Changes in Risk Sharing Drive the Changes in Investment? 
Shocks to current and future growth opportunities are only part of the story.   
Liberalization may also change a firm’s investment, because it alters the firm’s cost of capital.  
In turn, recall that liberalization affects the cost of capital through two channels: a common 
shock to the aggregate risk-free rate and a change in the firm-specific equity premium (risk 
sharing). 
For technical reasons, we defer empirical analysis of the common shock until Section 3.  
Here, we focus on whether the raw data provide any evidence that the invisible hand allocates 
investment in accordance with changes in risk sharing.  To do so, we need a measure of risk 
sharing.  Define the variable   as the annual historical covariance of firm i’s stock 
return with the local market minus its historical covariance with the world stock market.  The 
theoretical justification for DIFCOV also comes in Section 3, but intuitively, DIFCOV captures 
the beta effect to which the introduction alludes (page 3, third paragraph)—the potential 
diversification benefits that firm i provides to the representative foreign investor. 
i DIFCOV
Again, all else equal, high   firms should experience faster capital stock growth 
than low   firms in the aftermath of liberalizations.  The data, however, show no 
indication that changes in risk influence the cross-sectional allocation of investment (standard 
errors in parentheses; adjusted R-squared= -0.005; N=1080):  
DIFCOV
DIFCOV
(6)     it INVESTMENTDEVIATION  = 0.026 + 0.12  .  i DIFCOV
                                                                                       (0.01)   (0.18)  
 
  17The coefficient on DIFCOV is statistically insignificant.  More importantly, the 
coefficient on DIFCOV is economically trivial.  To get a sense of what trivial means, multiply 
the coefficient on DIFVCOV (0.12) by the average value of DIFCOV for the firms in the sample 
(0.015).  This calculation shows that the average annual effect of risk sharing on the typical 
firm’s capital stock growth is 0.0018 or 0.18 percentage points, which means that the effect on 
firm output growth is roughly 0.06 percentage points per annum—trivial.   
One might argue that changes in risk (DIFCOV) fail to matter for the allocation of 
physical capital because firms face financial constraints that hinder their ability to respond to the 
liberalization-induced stock price signals.  The problem with this explanation is that we have just 
seen (Section 2A.1) that there is little evidence to suggest that the firms in our sample are 
financially constrained.  Furthermore, there are large increases in investment following 
liberalization; it is just that DIFCOV does not guide the increases.  It is not clear why financial 
constraints would permit a firm to substantially increase its investment, but prevent it from doing 
so in a way that incorporates changes in risk.   
 
2B.1  Is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) the Relevant Risk-Sharing Benchmark? 
Characterizing firms’ insensitivity to risk as evidence of inefficient investment may seem 
unjust, because the risk-sharing hypothesis is a hollow straw man.  Since there is little evidence 
to suggest that levels of expected stock returns in the US vary cross-sectionally according to the 
degree of firms’ exposure to aggregate covariance risk, the notion that firms in developing 
countries allocate physical investment in accordance with the CAPM seems to fly in the face of 
all common sense. 
  18Yet there is no hiding from economic theory, even for the most practical of 
considerations (Keynes, 1936, p. 383-84).  All major studies of the gains to trade in risky assets 
lean heavily on the intuition that covariance risk can be priced (Lewis, 1999, 2000; Obstfeld, 
1994; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, Chapter 5).  Whether the asset pricing model uses a partial 
equilibrium or general equilibrium consumption-based approach, all of these papers are 
predicated on the validity of beta-like intuition: The potential gains to international risk sharing 
stem from the extent to which trade in risky assets permits individuals to smooth covariance risk.   
When a liberalization occurs, the relevant benchmark for pricing covariance risk switches 
from the local stock market index to the world market index.  New evidence suggests that the 
changes in covariance risk that occur during liberalizations also drive the attendant changes in 
returns (Chari and Henry, 2004).  While changes in risk may drive changes in returns, the more 
pressing economic question is whether the allocation of physical investment also reflects changes 
in risk sharing: Optimal smoothing of production risk in an open-capital-market world requires 
the reallocation of physical capital in accordance with changes in covariance risk.  We provide a 
small step forward by using firm-level data to provide the first empirical test of this prediction. 
 
3.  A Simple Model of Firm-Level Investment, Stock Prices, and Liberalization 
This section of the paper generates empirically testable, cross-sectional predictions about 
firm-level investment, stock prices, and liberalization.  It does so by analyzing what happens to 
the investment of an all equity-financed firm when the country in which that firm resides moves 
from a regime where foreigners are not permitted to own domestic shares and domestic residents 
  19cannot invest abroad, to one where all stocks are fully tradable.
6  We begin by making all of the 
standard assumptions that are necessary for the CAPM to hold.  For expositional convenience, 
we also assume that all investors have an identical coefficient of relative risk aversion γ .  The 
frictionless capital markets framework highlights the key margins at which liberalization affects 
firms’ investment decisions, but the empirical analysis in Section 4 incorporates the possibility of 
financial frictions discussed in Section 2A.1. 
 
3A.  Firm-Level Investment Before the Liberalization 
Consider a small country in financial autarky. The goal is to use the standard firm-level 
investment equation 
( 7 )         i
i
I
ab Q
K
=+


  
to show how liberalization changes a firm’s desired investment.  Assume that the firm is 100-
percent equity financed so that its capital market value equals the stock market value of its 
equity.  Let  i π   denote the firm’s stochastic cash flow, which is expected to grow exponentially at 
the rate .  Since the stock market value of the firm is the present discounted value of its 
expected future cash flow, we may express Tobin’s formula, 
i g
i
i
i
V
Q
K
= , in a more primitive form: 
( 8 )       
[]
i
i
ii i Kr g
Q
π
θ
=
+−
 
Where   denotes the number of units of firm i's capital, r is the economy’s risk-free interest 
rate, 
i K
i π  the expected value of  i π  , and θi the risk premium on firm i’s stock.  
                                                 
6The results do not hang on this assumption.  Chari and Henry (2004) address alternative assumptions. 
  203B.  Firm-Level Investment After the Liberalization 
Now suppose that the country opens its stock market to the rest of the world and also 
allows its residents to invest abroad.  Equations (7) and (8) show that liberalization affects 
investment through its effect on the fundamentals.  Interest rates, risk premia, and expected 
future growth rates may all change instantaneously in response to the news of liberalization.  In 
contrast, the stock of capital,  , adjusts more slowly because it takes time to buy and install 
new machines.  Hence, define “on-impact” as a period of time that is long enough for asset 
prices to adjust to liberalization but too short for the capital stock to do so as well, and let Q  
denote the on-impact value of Q for firm i. 
i K
*
i
A little bit of algebra shows that the on-impact change in Q may be written as: 
(9)      () ( ) ( )
** * * * iii i i i i i QQQ r r gg λθ θ   ∆≡−= − +− + −   
Where  , 
* r
*
i θ and   are the post-liberalization values of the fundamentals and 
*
i g
() ()
**
i
i
i i g g * i r ii Kr
π
λ
θθ
=
 +−  +−
.  The on-impact change in Q will drive the subsequent 
adjustment in the firm’s capital stock.  Since Q has changed, the capital stock must also adjust to 
reestablish equilibrium. Specifically, the liberalization-induced change in the firm’s desired 
investment, which we denote 
*
i
I
K
 ∆


 , must equal 
*
i Q ∆ .
7  In other words, the post-liberalization 
change in investment can be written as: 
(10)      () () (
*
** * ii i i
i
I
rr g g
K
λθ θ  ) i   − + − + −  ∆=   
. 
                                                 
7  Adjustment costs may deter firms from installing capital until Q returns to its pre-liberalization level, but the on-
impact change in Q will still drive the direction and magnitude of the change in the capital stock. 
  21Now, the pre- and post-liberalization risk premia ( i θ  and 
*
i θ ) are not directly observable, 
so it takes one more step to deliver an empirically testable equation.  Recall that under the 
CAPM,  , {( ) /() } ii M M Cov R R Var R R θ = M , where the variable  M R  is the excess return on the 
domestic market portfolio,  M R  its expected value, and CO  the historical covariance 
of firm i’s stock return with the local market.  Similarly, 
( ) M V , i R R
* θ
, i R
, ii R =
( W DIFC
{( v
] γ =
) /( ) } W W R Var R R
OV
W Co
)
, where 
the subscript W indexes the world market portfolio.  Using these definitions and a bit of algebra, 
it can be shown that  .  Finally, using the 
definition of DIFCOV we may rewrite equation (10) as 
* −= [( , ) ii i M COV R R COV R θθ γ −
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The three terms in brackets on the right-hand-side of equation (11) highlight the forces that drive 
the change in investment following the liberalization. 
The first term,  , has no subscript because it captures the effect of the common 
shock to the cost of capital.  The second term, , does have a subscript, because it 
measures the impact of the firm-specific change in risk sharing (the beta effect).  Given the first 
term, the second implies that high DIFCOV firms will experience a larger fall in the cost of 
capital (and therefore more investment) than low DIFCOV firms.  The third term, () , 
shows that larger the increase in the growth rate of a firm’s expected future cash flow, the greater 
the change in its post-liberalization investment. 
* ( rr − )
i DIFCOV
*
ii gg −
 
4.  Estimating the Investment Response: Methodology and Empirical Results 
  22The  i λ  term in front of the brackets in equation (11) is a firm-specific scaling factor that 
has some technical implications for empirical estimation.  If the  i λ ’s were observable, we could 
transform the terms in brackets to yield an equation with constant coefficients.  The problem is 
that the  i λ ’s are not observable.  In the absence of observable  i λ ’s, it would seem natural to 
estimate equation (11) with a random coefficients model that accounts for the firm-specific 
regression coefficients on sales growth, the common shock, and  .  i OV DIFC
The problem with random coefficients estimation is that it requires time variation in all of 
the right-hand-side variables, but DIFCOV is a purely cross-sectional variable.  For each firm, 
 is simply one number—the historical covariance of firm i with the local market minus 
its historical covariance with the world market.  Since we cannot estimate (11) using random 
coefficients, we begin with a panel specification that ignores the scale effect.  Section 4D shows 
that ignoring the scale effect is inconsequential, so we estimate the following: 
i DIFCOV
(12)   1 ijt j ijt INVESTMENTDEVIATION CNTRY CASHFLOWDEVIATION α β = ++ +  
23 ijt ij ijt FUTUREGROWTH DIFCOV β βε + + ,  t [0, 3] ∈ + . 
Equation (12) estimates the effect of changes in Q on changes in investment and captures 
all of the qualitative features that are present in the structural decomposition of equation (11).  
The left-hand-side variable in (12),  ijt INVESTMENTDEVIATION , is the deviation of firm i’s 
capital stock growth from its firm-specific mean.  The subscript t indicates the time variation in 
that variable over the years [0, +3].  The constant α  measures the common shock to the cost of 
capital.  The country-specific dummy variable   accounts for the possibility that the 
magnitude of the common shock differs across countries. 
j CNTRY
Although   does not appear in the theoretical decomposition  ijt CASHFLOWDEVIATION
  23of equation (11), we include it in specification (12) because of the evidence in Section 2 that 
current sales is related to investment.    controls for firm-specific shocks to 
sales growth.  It bears repeating that by definition   controls for all shocks 
to cash flows: those incidental to stock market liberalization, those resulting from the effects of 
other reforms such as trade liberalization, and those due to any other unexpected shocks.   
 controls for changes in firm-specific equity premia.   
ijt FUTUREGROWTH
FUTU
ij DIFCOV
ijt REGROWTH
ijt REGROWTH
DIF
ij DIFCOV
ij DIFCOV
INVESTMENTDEVI
INVESTMEN
ij SHFLOWDEVIATION
TDEVIATIO
t FUTUREGRO
The panel regression pools all firms together, so even though   does not vary 
over time for any given firm, it does vary across firms for any given time period.  Equation (12) 
uses precisely this cross-firm variation for any given time period to estimate the coefficient on 
.  In contrast to the coefficient on  , equation (12) estimates the beta 
coefficient on   by making use of both the time series variation in sales 
growth within a firm and the cross-sectional variation in sales growth across firms.  To see this, 
simply note that the variable   has both a firm and a time subscript.  As in 
Section 1A, we control for the clustering of firms around a common liberalization date. 
ij COV
ijt FUTUREGROWTH
FUTU
 
4A.  Results: Changes in Growth and the Common Shock Matter, Changes in Risk Do Not 
Table 5 reports the estimations of equation (12).  All the regressions include country-
fixed effects.  Column (1) reports the regression of  ijt ATION  on a constant 
and country-fixed effects with no other controls.  The coefficient on the constant is 0.041 and is 
significant at the one-percent level.   
Column (2) reports the regression of  ijt N  on a constant and 
 and  .  The coefficient on  ijt WTH CA
  24ijt CASHFLOWDEVIATION
FUTUREGRO
 is 0.229 and also significant at the one-percent level.  The 
coefficient on   is 0.315 and significant at the one-percent level.  Again, the 
estimate of the constant, 0.019, is economically and statistically significant. 
ijt WTH
ij DIFCOV
DIF
Column (3) of Table 5 reports the regression of  ijt INVESTMENTDEVIATION  on a 
constant and  .  The constant in this specification is 0.028 and significant at the one-
percent level.  The coefficient on   is positive, as predicted by the theory, but the 
coefficient is now even smaller (0.037) than the effect in the raw data (0.12) and is statistically 
insignificant.   
ij DIFCOV
Column (4) reports the results from the full decomposition suggested by equation (11).  
The coefficient on CASHFLOWDEVIATION is 0.316.  The coefficient on   
is 0.287.  Both coefficients are significant at the one-percent level.  The constant is not 
significant in this regression.  DIFCOV continues to be economically and statistically 
insignificant. 
ijt FUTUREGROWTH
 
4B.  Are Changes in the Cost of Capital Irrelevant for Changes in Investment?  
While the coefficient on   in Columns 1 through 4 of Table 5 is trivial, the 
constant is significant in 3 of the 4 regressions.  So, there is some evidence that the common 
shock to the cost of capital affects the post-liberalization changes in investment.  Having said 
that, interpreting a significant constant as the impact of the common shock is not without 
difficulty.  In theory, the constant captures the common shock, but in practice it might be picking 
up the effect of an unobserved regime shift that has nothing to do with a change in the cost of 
capital—a spike in investment due to some omitted variable that is important for investment but 
ij COV
  25lies outside of our model, for example. 
In order to scrutinize whether changes in the cost of capital really matter, Column (5) of 
Table 5 reports the results of a regression of  ijt INVESTMENTDEVIATION
ijt LIBERALIZATIONR
LIBERALIZATIO
ijt WTH ASHFL
ij ETURN
 on a constant, 
,  , and  .  The 
logic of this regression is straightforward.  Theory says that   is 
driven by changes in expected future cash flows and the cost of capital.  Since we are controlling 
for changes in cash flows with   and C , a 
significant coefficient on   in this regression would suggest a 
significant effect of the cost of capital on investment. 
ijt FUTUREGROWTH CASHFLOWDEVIATION
FUTUREGRO
LIBERALIZATIONR
ij ETURN
NRET
OWDEVIATION
ij URN
ijt
Column (5) shows that the coefficient on    is 0.030 and 
significant at the 5-percent level.  This is a smaller number, 0.057, than the coefficient on 
 in equation (1), but it is still economically significant and suggests 
that firms’ post-liberalization changes in investment are significantly related to changes in their 
overall cost of capital. 
ij LIBERALIZATIONRETURN
ij LIBERALIZATIONRETURN
It is also important to note that the constant is no longer significant in the specification 
reported in Column (5).  If the significant constant in columns (1) through (3) reflects some 
spurious regime shift in investment that is unrelated to a change in the cost of capital, then the 
constant should be unaffected by the inclusion of   on the right-
hand-side, but this is not the case.  Column (6) reports the results from an additional regression 
that includes only   on the right-hand side; the numbers show that 
the coefficient on   is significant, the constant is not.  
ij LIBERALIZATIONRETURN
ij LIBERALIZATIONRETURN
ij LIBERALIZATIONRETURN
To confirm that risk sharing plays no role in guiding the post-liberalization allocation of 
  26investment, Column (7) reports the results of a final specification.  We regress 
ijt INVESTMENTDEVIATION
ij LIBERALIZATIONRETURN
 on a constant,  ,   and 
.  The coefficient on   is 0.042 and 
significant at the 5-percent confidence level.  The coefficient on   is 0.317 
and significant at the one-percent level.  The coefficient on   remains economically and 
statistically insignificant. 
ijt FUTUREGROWTH
LIBERALIZATIONRET
FUTU
ij DIFCOV
ij DIFCOV
ij
ijt WTH
URN
REGRO
 
4C.  Robustness: Random Coefficients and a New Definition of Investment Deviations 
The regression specifications in Table 5 do not adjust for firm-specific scale effects.  In 
order to examine the robustness of not doing so, we re-estimate a subset of the results using the 
following random coefficients specification: 
(13)   ijt j i ijt ijt INVESTMENTDEVIATION CNTRY FUTUREGROWTH α βε = ++ + , 
[0, 3] t∈+ . 
 
Equation (13) differs from equation (12) in two important ways.  First,   and 
 are not included on the right-hand-side, because they are cross-
sectional variables.  Second, the coefficient on  ,
ij DIFCOV
ij LIBERALIZATIONRETURN
ijt FUTUREGROWTH i β , is now firm-specific. 
Random coefficients estimation calculates the coefficient on   using 
a two-step procedure.  The first step adjusts for firm scale effects in the following fashion.  For a 
given firm, the random coefficients procedure uses the time variation in   to 
generate an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression coefficient.  This coefficient measures the 
firm-specific effect of   on investment.  The first step is then repeated for 
each firm in the sample.  The second step uses all the firm-specific OLS estimates to create a 
ijt FUTUREGROWTH
FUTUREGROWT ijt H
ijt FUTUREGROWTH
  27single estimate of the effect of the right-hand-side variable on investment.  It does so by using 
the  i λ ’s from equation (11) to generate a weighted average of the firm-specific OLS coefficients. 
U
U
NVEST
U
If scale effects are important, then the random coefficients estimate of the coefficient on 
 should differ significantly from the earlier estimate of the coefficient on 
 that does not adjust for scale effects (Column (2) of Table 5).  This is not 
the case.  The coefficient on   using random coefficients is 0.167 and 
significant at the 1-percent level.  Similarly, the constant is 0.015 and significant at the 5-percent 
level.   
ijt FUT REGROWTH
ijt FUT REGROWTH
ijt FUTUREGROWTH
It is also important to ask whether the measure of capital stock growth deviations is 
sensitive to the choice of the pre-liberalization window.  If countries liberalize in response to 
crises or recessions, then using the three years immediately preceding the liberalization as a 
benchmark may overstate the abnormal growth rate of the capital stock in the post-liberalization 
period.  Table 6 replicates all of the results in Table 5 using a new left-hand-side variable called 
ijt I MENTDEVIATION1
ijt FUT REGROWTH
ij LIBERALIZATIONRETURN
, which is defined as the growth rate of firm i's capital stock in 
year t minus its average growth rate in the entire pre-liberalization period.  The results in Table 6 
are very similar to those in Table 5.  The variables C  and 
 are always significant, the constant and the coefficient on 
 are often significant, and   never matters. 
ijt ASHFLOWDEVIATION
ij OV DIFC
 
5.  Why Do Firms Ignore Risk? 
The evidence so far suggests that changes in risk sharing have negligible empirical 
implications for investment, but it is possible that the significance of risk sharing is masked by 
  28measurement error.  For example, when countries liberalize, some publicly listed firms become 
eligible for foreign ownership (investible), while others remain off limits (non-investible).  Data 
from the IFC’s Emerging Markets Database show that DIFCOV robustly explains the change in 
the cost of capital for investible firms, but is never significant for the non-investible ones (Chari 
and Henry, 2004).  Therefore, it is possible that changes in investment are significantly 
correlated with DIFCOV for the investible firms, but the relation is masked because the 
investible and non-investible firms are grouped together in our sample. 
The investible and non-investible firms are grouped together in our sample, because the 
IFC Corporate Finance Database—the source of all the capital stock data—does not identify 
investible and non-investible firms.  The Emerging Markets Database distinguishes between 
investible and non-investible firms, but it contains no capital stock data.  By using the 
information in the EMDB, we were able to identify 61 investible and 28 non-investible firms in 
the IFC Corporate Finance database.  We then redid the entire battery of tests for risk sharing on 
this sample of 89 firms.  Again, DIFCOV was never significant. 
Returning to the full sample, we conducted three additional tests for evidence of risk 
sharing.  First, we constructed a new risk-sharing variable called DIFCOV1 using the growth rate 
of real earnings instead of stock returns.  Specifically, DIFCOV1 is defined as the annual 
historical covariance of firm i’s real earnings growth with the aggregate growth rate of real 
earnings on the local market, minus the annual historical covariance of firm i’s real earnings 
growth with the aggregate growth rate of real earnings on the S&P 500.  Second, we sorted the 
firms by the sign of DIFCOV.  Firms for whom DIFCOV is greater than zero we label 
DIFCOVPOSITIVE; firms for whom DIFCOV is less than zero we label DIFCOVNEGATIVE.  
Third, we ranked the firms in descending order of the magnitude of DIFCOV.  Firms in the top 
  2920 percent of the distribution we label DIFCOVHIGH; those in the bottom 20 percent we label 
DIFCOVLOW.  After constructing our three new risk-sharing variables, we reproduced the 
correlations in equation (6) using the three new measures of risk sharing.  None of the three new 
variables produced significant results.   
The result that changes in risk sharing do not guide the allocation of real resources stands 
in sharp contrast with the predictions of standard models of international finance.  By enabling 
domestic residents to engage in international risk sharing, capital account liberalization should 
encourage firms to implement high growth projects that were too risky to adopt in autarky 
(Obstfeld, 1994).  The expression for the liberalization-induced change in a firm’s cost of capital 
provides one possible explanation for why the data do not support this prediction: 
(14)       ( ) * ii r r DIFCOV ργ − + ∆= . 
Suppose that liberalization reduces the risk-free rate by 10 percentage points and that the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, takes on a value of 2.  Since the average value of 
 in our sample is 0.015, the average firm-specific change in the cost of capital will be 
3 percentage points (2 times 0.015), which means that the total fall in the cost of capital is 13 
percentage points.  The common shock, however, accounts for roughly 80 percent of the change. 
i DIFCOV
This simple numerical example illustrates a fundamental point.  If the common shock 
dominates firm-specific shocks, then in order to detect a cross-sectional relation between risk 
sharing and investment, DIFCOV must be precisely measured.  Since DIFCOV is not precisely 
measured, the simple explanation of measurement error may account for our results.  On the 
other hand, if the problem is not measurement error but rather that DIFCOV truly exerts no 
influence on the allocation of capital, then Morck et al.’s (2000) result on synchronicity of asset 
prices in emerging markets may extend to synchronicity of real investment. 
  306.  Conclusion 
Any conclusions about efficiency must be tempered by the result that firms appear 
insensitive to risk-induced changes in their cost of capital.  While this result may be driven by 
measurement error, the fact remains that changes in risk have no discernible impact on the cross-
sectional allocation of investment.  One may also argue, quite fairly, that the common shock to 
investment is simply an unspecified residual that may be unrelated to the fall in the aggregate 
cost of capital.  Whether the common shock operates primarily through a fall in the cost of 
capital, as suggested by theory, or via some unidentified channel, is open to interpretation. 
Yet it seems hard to argue that firms invest in a completely inefficient manner when they 
allocate capital in accordance with various measures of changes in profitability.  Furthermore, 
the common shock does help explain the post-liberalization increases in investment, and there is 
some evidence to suggest that it signifies a change in the cost of capital.  Regardless of how one 
chooses to interpret the common shock, the evidence in this paper does bring us a step closer to 
understanding whether investment is efficiently reallocated when countries remove barriers to 
international capital movements.  Applied to better data in the future, the firm-level identification 
strategy developed here may bring us yet nearer. 
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  34Figure 1. The Growth Rate of Firms' Capital Stocks Increase Following Liberalizations.
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Figure 1.  Capital stock growth is the growth rate of firm i's capital stock in year t minus the average growth rate of firm i's capital in the entire period preceding 
the liberalization (t = [-1,-5]).  The y-axis measures the average growth rate of the capital stock across the firms in our sample.  The x-axis measures time in 
terms of years relative to liberalization: t=0 is the liberalization year; t = [-1,-5] is the pre-liberalization period and t = [+1,+3] is the post-liberalization period. 
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Figure 2.  The Rate of Return to Capital Rises With Liberalization.
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Figure 2.  The y-axis represents E/K which is the average rate of return to net fixed assets or the aggregate rate of return to capital.  For each firm, we compute 
the flow return to the stock of capital as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the value of net fixed assets.  E/K represents the average of this ratio 
across the 369 firms in our sample.  The x-axis measures time in terms of years relative to liberalization: t=0 is the liberalization year; t = [-1, -3] is the pre-
liberalization period and t = [+1, +3] is the post-liberalization period. Figure 3.  Sales and  Earnings Growth Increase With Liberalization.
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Figure 3.  Sales and earnings growth are the first difference of the log of sales and earnings for any given firm.  The y-axis measures the average growth rate of 
sales and earnings across the firms in our sample.  The x-axis measures time in terms of years relative to liberalization: t=0 is the liberalization year; t = [-1, -3] is 
the pre-liberalization period and t = [+1, +3] is the post-liberalization period. 
  37Table 1.  The Firms in Our Sample Constitute a Substantial Fraction of Economic Activity in Their Country. 
    
 
 
Country 
 
Market Capitalization 
of Firms as a Fraction of 
Total Market Capitalization 
 
 
Number of Firms 
 
 
 
Liberalization Year 
 
Percentage Change 
in Tobin’s Q During 
Liberalization Year  
        
India 
 
0.25        
        
        
        
        
        
99 1992 81.5
Jordan 
 
0.14 35 1987 9.6
Korea 
 
0.38 89 1987 57.7
Malaysia 
 
0.45 85 1987 -28.5
Thailand 
 
0.66 61 1988 95.9
Full Sample 
 
0.40 369 NA 46.1
 
Notes:  Column 1 presents the fraction of total market capitalization that the firms in our sample represent as a fraction of total market capitalization in 
the respective countries.  The total market capitalization represents the value of all publicly traded companies on the domestic exchange in the 
liberalization year.  Column 2 gives the number of firms in each country.  Column 3 contains the liberalization date for each country in our sample; the 
liberalization dates are taken from Henry (2000a, 2000b, 2003). 
 
 
  38                             Table 2.  The Firm-Level Investment Boom is Economically and Statistically Significant. 
 
Right-Hand-Side 
Variables 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
      
LIBERALIZATION[0]   
       
   
       
   
       
   
       
0.018
(0.017) 
0.023 
(0.018) 
0.041* 
(0.021) 
 
0.047** 
(0.022) 
LIBERALIZATION[+1] 0.055***
(0.020) 
0.062*** 
(0.021) 
0.044* 
(0.024) 
0.047* 
(0.025) 
LIBERALIZATION[+2] 0.069***
(0.020) 
0.077*** 
(0.021) 
0.077*** 
(0.025) 
0.082*** 
(0.026) 
LIBERALIZATION[+3] 0.039**
(0.020) 
0.047** 
(0.021) 
0.063** 
(0.032) 
0.069** 
(0.033) 
Sum of  
LIBERALIZATION[0,+3]
 
0.041*** 
(0.013) 
0.048*** 
(0.013) 
 
0.049*** 
(0.017) 
0.054*** 
(0.018) 
Notes: Table 2 presents results for alternative specifications of the benchmark regression, which is given by the 
following equation:  (ln ) [0] [ 1] [ 2] [ 3] K Lib Lib Lib Lib Firm ijt i ijt α ε ∆= + + + + + + + + + . Rows 1, 2, 3, and 4, present the 
coefficient estimates for the liberalization year and years 1, 2 and 3 post-liberalization, respectively.  Row 5 presents 
the cumulative coefficient estimate for the four years taken together.  The left-hand-side variable is the first difference 
of the log of the capital stock (investment).  Column (1) presents the coefficient estimates for the regression 
specification that controls for firm-fixed effects.  Column (2) presents the coefficient estimates for the regression 
specification that controls for country-fixed effects.  Column (3) controls for world business cycle effects: the 
contemporaneous growth rate of OECD industrial production, the three-month real US Treasury bill rate, and the 10-
year real US government bond rate Column (4) incorporates controls for both firm-fixed effects and world business 
cycle effects.  All specifications control for clustering in the error structure.  The symbols (***), (**) and (*) represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
  39Table 3.  Investment Responds More Strongly to Current Sales Growth During Liberalization Years. 
             
Right-Hand-Side Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
     
(5)  (6) 
                         
SALESGROWTH                     
           
                   
           
               
            
                 
            
                 
           
                 
           
             
   
               
0.3072***
(0.0186) 
 
0.1593***
(0.015) 
   
0.1084***
(0.016) 
   
01239***
(0.015) 
   
SALESGROWTH*LIBERALIZATION  0.0555*
(0.0302) 
 
0.1788***
(0.027) 
   
0.2085***
(0.028) 
   
01899***
(0.0288) 
   
FUTURESALES1    0.1004***
(0.0177) 
   
0.1158***
(0.0154) 
   
  01499***
(0.016) 
   
FUTURESALES1*LIBERALIZATION    0.0316
(0.0301) 
   
-0.021
(0.028) 
   
  -00559
(0.0303) 
   
FUTURESALES2    0.0491**
(0.021) 
   
0.0579***
(0.0164) 
   
0.070***
(0.016) 
   
FUTURESALES2*LIBERALIZATION    0.0141 
(0.034) 
   
-0.0386
(0.035) 
   
-0.0547
(0.0311) 
   
Constant   0.0648***  0.1064***
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
   
0.0919***
(0.005) 
   
0.1117***
(.006) 
   
0.1035***
(0.005) 
   
0.0862***
(0.005) 
   
R-squared 0.13   0.03   0.08   0.02   0.05   0.08
SALESGROWTH is measured as the first difference of the log of contemporaneous sales for any given firm over the entire sample period.  FUTURESALES1 and 
FUTURESALES2 measure the first and second leads of the growth rate of sales which is defined as the first difference of the log of sales.  LIBERALIZATION is a dummy 
variable that takes on the value of one in the liberalization year and the three years following it.  All interactions terms between the SALES variables and the liberalization 
dummy measure the change in the elasticity of the investment response to sales growth during the liberalization window.  The symbols (***), (**) and (*) represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
  40Table 4.  The Firms in Our Sample Have Access to External Finance. 
    
 
 
Variable 
 
Pre-Liberalization 
Average 
 
 
Post-Liberalization 
Average 
 
Post-Liberalization 
Average Differs From 
Pre? 
 
Change in 
Dividends/NFA 
 
 0.0336     
      
       
      
       
      
       
      
       
      
       
       
       
0.0525 Yes***
Change in Long-term 
liabilities/change in NFA 
 
0.521 2.222 No
Change in External 
Finance1/Change in NFA 
 
0.237 1.357 No
Change in External 
Finance2/Change in NFA 
 
1.192 1.285 No
Change in Retained 
Earnings/Change in NFA 
 
0.516 1.534 No
Change in Internal 
sources/NFA 
0.015 0.080 Yes*
 
Change in equity/change 
in NFA 
0.363 1.026 No
     
Change in dividends/NFA is the first difference of the log of the ratio of dividends divided by net fixed assets for each firm.  External Finance1 for 
each firm is the sum of long-term liabilities and net worth less retained earnings.  Change in external finance1 is the first difference of the log of 
external finance1 for each firm.  Change in NFA is the first difference of the log of net fixed assets for each firm.  External Finance2 for each firm 
is the sum of total liabilities and net worth less retained earnings.  Change in external finance2 is the first difference of the log of external finance2 
for each firm.  Change in retained earnings is the first difference of the log of retained earnings or total reserves for each firm.  Internal sources is 
earnings after taxes less dividends paid for each firm.  Change in internal sources/NFA is the first difference of the log of internal sources to net 
fixed assets for each firm.  Equity is paid in capital or net worth less retained earnings.  All changes are calculated on an annual basis for each firm.  
Pre-lib average is the average for any given variable across firms and countries for the period t=-3 to t=-1.  Post-liberalization average is the 
average for any given variable across firms and countries for the period t=0 to t=+3. 
  41Table 5.  Changes in Firms’ Fundamentals Significantly Predict Their Post-Liberalization Changes in Investment. 
 
Right-Hand-Side 
Variables 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
 
(7) 
          
CONSTANT    0.041
*** 
(0.010) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
 
0.028
*** 
(0.011) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.009) 
 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
 
0.0004 
(0.013) 
 
-0.013 
(.011) 
     
         
     
         
     
       
      
      
       
               
               
CASHFLOWDEVIATION  0.229***
(0.047) 
 
0.316***  0.213*** 
(0.047) 
 
(0.048) 
 
0.268***
(0.048) 
   
FUTUREGROWTH  0.315***
(0.029) 
 
0.287***  0.344*** 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 
0.339***
(0.033) 
   
DIFCOV  0.037  -0.027 
(0.195) 
 
(0.177) 
 
-0.069
(0.184) 
   
LIBERALIZATIONRETURN  0.0298**  0.057
(0.015) 
 
*** 
(0.016) 
 
0.042*** 
(0.014) 
 
Adjusted  R-Squared
 
0.01
 
0.088
 
0.00
 
0.09
 
0.10
 
0.01
 
0.12
 
Number  of  Observations. 1293 1292 1080 1079 1184 1185 1054
Notes: Table 5 presents results for alternative specifications of the benchmark regression, which is given by the following equation: 
INVESTMENTDEVIATION CNTRY CASHFLOWDEVIATION 1 ijt j ijt αβ =+ + +   FUTUREGROWTH DIFCOV 23 ijt ij ijt ββ ε + + ,  [0 t , 3] ∈ + .  All deviations are 
defined as the growth rate of the variable in year t minus the average growth rate of the variable in the three-year period prior to the liberalization.  The left-hand-
side variable is  ijt INVESTMENTDEVIATION  is the growth rate of firm i's capital stock in year t minus the average growth rate of firm i's capital stock in the 
three-year period preceding the liberalization (t=[-3, -1]).    is the growth rate of firm i's sales growth in the liberalization year minus 
the average growth rate of firm i's sales in the three-year period preceding the liberalization.  
ijt ION
ijt
CASHFLOWDEVIAT
FUTUREGROWTH
i DIFCOV
ij
 is the growth rate of firm i's sales growth in 
years +1 to +3 minus the average growth rate of firm i's sales in the three-year period preceding the liberalization.    is the historical covariance of firm 
i’s returns with the local market minus its historical covariance with the world market LIBERALIZATIONRETURN is the percentage change in firm i’s real stock 
price during the liberalization year.    represents a set of country specific dummies that control for country fixed effects.  All specifications control for 
clustering in the error structure.  The symbols (***), (**) and (*) represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
j CNTRY
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Table 6.  Changes in Firms’ Fundamentals Significantly Predict Their Post-Liberalization Changes in Investment. 
 
Right-Hand-Side 
Variables 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
 
(7) 
 
CONSTANT  0.038
*** 
(0.009) 
0.0138 
(0.008) 
 
0.021
** 
(0.010) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.009) 
 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
 
0.004 
(0.012) 
 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
     
CASHFLOWDEVIATION           
            
         
            
       
            
      
        
           
               
0.281***
(0.046) 
0.316***  0.266*** 
(0.047)  (0.047)  
0.312***
(0.047) 
 
FUTUREGROWTH  0.329***
(0.027) 
0.289***  0.344*** 
(0.032)  (0.032) 
0.329***
(0.034) 
 
DIFCOV  -0.016  -0.0273 
(0.186)  (0.177) 
-0.044
(0.177) 
 
LIBERALIZATIONRETURN  0.021  0.046
(0.014) 
 
*** 
(0.015) 
 
0.028** 
(0.013) 
 
Adjusted R-Squared 
 
0.00  0.099  0.002  0.095  0.10  0.01  0.11 
 
Number  of  Observations. 1293 1292 1080 1079 1184 1185 1054
            
Notes: Table 6 presents results for alternative specifications of the benchmark regression, which is given by the following equation: 
INVESTMENTDEVIATION CNTRY CASHFLOWDEVIATION 1 ijt j ijt αβ =+ + +   FUTUREGROWTH DIFCOV 23 ijt ij ijt ββ ε + + ,  [0 t , 3] ∈ + . All deviations are 
defined as the growth rate of the variable in year t minus the average growth rate of the variable in the entire pre-liberalization period.  The left-hand-side 
variable is  ijt INVESTMENTDEVIATION  is the growth rate of firm i's capital stock in year t minus the average growth rate of firm i's capital stock in the three-
year period preceding the liberalization (t=[-3, -1]).    is the growth rate of firm i's sales growth in the liberalization year minus the 
average growth rate of firm i's sales in the three-year period preceding the liberalization.  
ijt CASHFLOWDEVIATION
ijt FUTUREGROWTH
i DIFCOV
ij LIBERALIZATIONRETURN
 is the growth rate of firm i's sales growth in 
years +1 to +3 minus the average growth rate of firm i's sales in the three-year period preceding the liberalization.    is the historical covariance of firm 
i’s returns with the local market minus its historical covariance with the world market is the unexpected percentage change in firm 
i’s real stock price during the liberalization year.    represents a set of country specific dummies that control for country fixed effects.  All specifications 
control for clustering in the error structure.  The symbols (***), (**) and (*) represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
j CNTRY